{"id":1033,"date":"2026-07-22T09:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-07-22T02:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mulyagusdin.com\/?p=1033"},"modified":"2026-07-23T08:18:27","modified_gmt":"2026-07-23T01:18:27","slug":"menjemput-investor-sebelum-bagi-hasil-selesai-urutan-yang-terbalik","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mulyagusdin.com\/en\/2026\/07\/22\/menjemput-investor-sebelum-bagi-hasil-selesai-urutan-yang-terbalik\/","title":{"rendered":"Courting Investors Before Profit-Sharing Is Settled, Isn't That Backwards?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Dalam kurun kurang dari tiga bulan, tiga rombongan investor mendatangi Kantor Gubernur Aceh dengan tawaran yang sama: mengolah gas Blok Andaman<\/a> di Kawasan Ekonomi Khusus (KEK) Arun, Lhokseumawe. Akhir April, sebuah perusahaan asal Dubai menyurati Gubernur Aceh soal rencana pabrik metanol. Awal Juli, giliran perusahaan asal Jiangsu, Tiongkok, bersama mitra nasionalnya di Jakarta, mengajukan proposal proyek likuefaksi gas alam cair (LNG). Pertengahan Juli, direksi PT Indoasia Oiltank Terminal datang langsung ke kantor gubernur, membawa serta tiga profesor Teknik Kimia Universitas Syiah Kuala. Gubernur Muzakir Manaf menyambutnya dengan terbuka: “Semoga membawa kebaikan dan kemakmuran bagi Aceh.”1<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

What's gotten far less attention amid all this fanfare: two weeks before the Indoasia Oiltank visit, the Governor sent another letter to a far more consequential address, the Istana Negara (State Palace). Its contents were not a welcome, but an objection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Letter With a Different Tone<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

In early July 2026, Governor Mualem wrote to President Prabowo Subianto with four requests regarding the management of Blok Andaman gas.2<\/sup> First, a revision of the profit-sharing scheme, since the portion the government currently receives (from which Aceh gets its share) is considered too small: only 4 percent for gas and 6 percent for oil.3<\/sup> Second, a request that gas from the Tangkulo field be processed onshore, at KEK Arun, rather than offshore. Third, a request for the President to instruct the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) to review the already-signed Plan of Development (PoD) I approval for the Tangkulo field. Fourth, a request for a special oil-and-gas allocation for Aceh.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Points two and three are the most fundamental, because both concern a decision that has already been made, not one still under negotiation. On 9 March 2026, Minister of ESDM Bahlil Lahadalia signed the PoD I approval for the Tangkulo field, a gas field operated by Mubadala Energy in the South Andaman Working Area.4<\/sup> The approved scheme is Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO): gas and condensate are processed at a floating facility offshore, then piped roughly 84 kilometers undersea to an Onshore Receiving Facility at KEK Arun.4<\/sup> This approval went unannounced to the public when it was signed, triggering protests from civil society organizations such as Taman Iskandar Muda, which called on the Minister of ESDM to revoke it.5<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Diagram
Source: Wikimedia, CC BY-SA 3.0 (WikiDon)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

In other words, the most fundamental decision, whether Blok Andaman gas would be processed offshore or onshore, had already been made by Jakarta without waiting for an agreement with Aceh. And Aceh itself has openly stated it rejects that scheme.6<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dua Ladang, Delapan Triliun Kaki Kubik<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Blok Andaman genuinely warrants this excitement. Mubadala Energy discovered gas reserves at the Layaran-1 exploration well in 2023, estimated at more than 6 trillion cubic feet (TCF), followed by a find at Tangkulo-1 in 2024 with potential of more than 2 TCF.7<\/sup> Combined, around 8 TCF of gas has been identified, one of Indonesia's largest oil-and-gas discoveries in the past decade. Tangkulo, whose PoD has already been approved, is only a third of that potential. The Layaran field, three times larger, hasn't even reached the PoD stage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A potential this large should make the negotiation process more careful, not more rushed. This is exactly the point where a more fundamental question deserves to be asked: before courting as many downstream investors as possible into KEK Arun, is there enough clarity on who has rights to the gas, what it will cost, and where it will be processed, to responsibly make promises to investors?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

KEK Arun Is Not a Blank Slate<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

There's another layer to this that's rarely mentioned in recent investor coverage: KEK Arun itself, the zone promised to become a downstream processing hub, has a track record that isn't exactly reassuring.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

KEK Arun was inaugurated by President Joko Widodo in December 2018, with a projected investment of Rp53 trillion over ten years. Three years later, by August 2021, realized investment stood at only around Rp3.3 trillion, less than 7 percent of the target, and all of it came from two state-owned enterprises that had already been operating at the site before KEK status was granted: PT Pupuk Iskandar Muda and PT PLN, not new investors drawn in by the KEK status itself.8<\/sup> Of the 15 KEKs running across Indonesia at the time, only four were judged to be on track, and KEK Arun wasn't one of them.8<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

One document from that era's archive, from before Blok Andaman became the spotlight it is today, is the zone's master plan, shown below.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Master
KEK Arun Master Plan document, Source: Author's personal archive<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

This isn't just a historical footnote that can be brushed aside. If new investors are now being invited into a zone that spent years failing to attract new investment, the fair question is: what has actually changed about the zone's own readiness, beyond the buzz of big names paying a visit?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Presentasi
Introducing KEK Arun to Aceh's banking sector, Source: Author's personal archive.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Why This Sequence Feels Backwards<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

There's a basic logic in extractive industries and industrial zones that's rarely broken without consequence: certainty over rights and the fiscal scheme is usually locked in first, then that certainty is sold to downstream investors. The reason is simple. Major investors, like the Chinese company eyeing the LNG project, or Indoasia Oiltank Terminal bringing in USK academics for a feasibility study, need firm answers to the most basic questions: where will the gas they'll process come from, how much of it is there, what will it cost, and by what route will it reach their facility? As long as those questions still hinge on the outcome of the unresolved PoD dispute and profit-sharing negotiation between Aceh and Jakarta, whatever answer the Aceh government can offer investors remains, at bottom, conditional.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When this sequence is reversed, two risks emerge at once. First, for investors: committing serious capital is difficult atop supply uncertainty, so what's likely to result is just another round of memoranda of understanding and courtesy visits, a pattern that mirrors KEK Arun's own history exactly. Second, for Aceh: every time the regional government shows up to welcome investors with high optimism while the dispute with the central government remains unresolved, Aceh's bargaining position at the PoD and profit-sharing negotiating table can actually weaken, because the impression created is that the zone will attract investors regardless of how the negotiation turns out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What Can Be Done Now<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Criticism without a way forward just adds to the noise. There are a few realistic steps the Aceh government can pursue, without having to turn away the investors already lining up.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

First<\/strong>, openly separate which agreements are already binding from which are still exploratory. Every memorandum of understanding with a prospective investor should explicitly state that its realization depends on the final outcome of the PoD revision and the profit-sharing scheme, rather than being left to appear as though everything is already a done deal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Second<\/strong>, finish the institutional homework inside KEK Arun itself before selling the zone as an investment-ready destination. Investors of the caliber now knocking on Aceh's door won't wait around for the kind of protracted internal bureaucracy that once held back the wave of investors three years ago.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Third<\/strong>, make the final outcome of the PoD and profit-sharing negotiation, not the number of investor letters of interest received, the measure of success communicated to the public. The people of Aceh deserve to know that news of new investors doesn't mean the underlying issue has been resolved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Aceh has good reason to be excited about Blok Andaman. Eight trillion cubic feet of gas doesn't come around twice in a generation. But welcoming an opportunity this large with the sequence reversed, investors first, certainty later, risks repeating the old pattern: many come knocking, few actually stay.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Sources and references<\/h3>\n\n\n\n